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Background: Over the past decade, global health issues have become more prominent in foreign policies at the
national level. The process to develop state level global health strategies is arguably a form of global health
diplomacy (GHD). Despite an increase in the volume of secondary research and analysis in this area, little primary
research, particularly that which draws directly on the perspectives of those involved in these processes, has been
conducted. This study seeks to fill this knowledge gap through an empirical case study of Health is Global: A
UK Government Strategy 2008–2013. It aims to build understanding about how and why health is integrated
into foreign policy and derive lessons of potential relevance to other nations interested in developing
whole-of-government global health strategies.
Methods: The major element of the study consisted of an in-depth investigation and analysis of the UK global
health strategy. Document analysis and twenty interviews were conducted. Data was organized and described
using an adapted version of Walt and Gilson’s policy analysis triangle. A general inductive approach was used to
identify themes in the data, which were then analysed and interpreted using Fidler’s health and foreign policy
conceptualizations and Kingdon’s multiples streams model of the policymaking process.
Results: The primary reason that the UK decided to focus more on global health is self-interest - to protect national
and international security and economic interests. Investing in global health was also seen as a way to enhance the
UK’s international reputation. A focus on global health to primarily benefit other nations and improve global health
per se was a prevalent through weaker theme. A well organized, credible policy community played a critical role in
the process and a policy entrepreneur with expertise in both international relations and health helped catalyze
attention and action on global health when the time was right. Support from the Prime Minister and from the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office was essential. The process to arrive at a government-wide strategy was
complex and time-consuming, but also broke down silos. Significant negotiation and compromise were required
from actors with widely varying perspectives on global health and conflicting priorities.
Conclusions: As primarily an exploratory study, this research sheds significant light on the global health
policymaking process at the level of the state. It provides a useful and important starting point for further
hypothesis driven empirical research that focuses on the integration of health in foreign policy, how and why this
happens and whether or not it makes an impact on improving global health.
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Figure 1 The Policy Analysis Circle.
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Over the past decade, global health issues have become
more prominent in foreign policies at the national level
[1-6]. In 2007 the foreign ministers of Brazil, France,
Indonesia, Norway, Senegal, South Africa and Thailand
launched the Foreign Policy and Global Health (FPGH)
initiative and the Oslo Ministerial Declaration and
renewed it in 2010 [7,8]. Since 2008, the United Nations
General Assembly has adopted three resolutions resolving
that governments should pay more attention to global
health in their foreign policies [9-11].
As nations become more interconnected and inter-
dependent and health issues become increasingly global,
state actors have more incentives to work together and
with a variety of non-state actors on health issues that
transcend national boundaries [12]. The process of
negotiated collective action for global health has come
to be referred to as ‘global health diplomacy’ (GHD), the
‘policy-shaping processes through which state, non-state
and other institutional actors negotiate responses to
health challenges, or utilise health concepts or mecha-
nisms in policy-shaping and negotiation strategies, to
achieve other political, economic or social objectives’
[[13], p. 10]. The manner in which this concept is used,
however, is highly diverse and the GHD process itself
poorly understood [13,14]. Little empirical research that
draws directly on the perspectives and experiences of
those involved in GHD processes has been undertaken
leading to strong calls for more descriptive, analytical,
conceptual and practical rigour [5,15-17]. This paper
contributes to this goal by critically examining health in
foreign policy (HiFP) through an empirical case study of
Health is Global Strategy: A UK Government Strategy
2008–2013 (Health is Global).
Methods
The major element of the study consisted of an in-depth
investigation and analysis of Health is Global launched
in 2008. Of the countries with some formal strategy for
GHD, the UK global health strategy is the most detailed
and comprehensive.
Literature review, document analysis and semi-
structured interviews were used to conduct the UK case,
as well as three background case reviews (Norway,
Switzerland and Brazil). This article reports only on the
primary UK case. To structure data for subsequent ana-
lysis and interpretation using the theoretical frameworks
(Fidler’s health and foreign policy conceptualizations and
Kingdon’s multiples streams model of the policymaking
process) an adapted version of Walt and Gilson’s policy
analysis triangle [18,19] was used as an heuristic device
to gather and organize a comprehensive and relevant set
of data in five areas (Figure 1): the policy context within
which the policy was developed (i.e. context for andreasons why the policy was developed); the policy pro-
cesses (i.e. how the policy was developed and is being
implemented); the policy content (i.e. the global health
issues to be addressed through the policy and how
health is positioned in the policy discourse); and the
actors involved (i.e. who and what role they played in
the process) [18,19]. A fifth important category, indica-
tions of impact, was added to capture data that focused
on potential and actual effects of the policy.
Data were analyzed, interpreted and explained using
Fidler’s health and foreign policy conceptualizations [20]
and Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Model of the policy-
making process [21-23]. Fidler’s work is grounded in
international relations theory and posits three arguments
for why health has risen as a foreign policy issue – revo-
lution, remediation and regression (Table 1). Kingdon’s
model of the policymaking process is a highly reputable,
evidence-based model that focuses on understanding
why some topics become prominent on the policy
agenda and others do not, and why certain policy alter-
natives are seriously considered while others are
neglected (Figure 2). Together these frameworks provide
a useful and novel mechanism for analyzing and
interpreting the study findings and arriving at conclu-
sions in light of the main research question – how and
why is health integrated into foreign policy?
Purposive sampling was used to identify and recruit
interviewees for semi-structured interviews. State and
non-state actors who had been directly involved in
health and foreign policy integration in each of the four
countries were targeted for interviews. A total of twenty
interviews were conducted, fourteen for the UK case
(seven each with state and non-state actors). Access to
interviewees was not an issue; however repeated
Table 1 Summary of Fidler’s health and foreign policy conceptualizations [20]
Conceptualization Description
Revolution • Health’s increasing role in foreign policy is transformative of the health-foreign policy nexus
• Health collapses the traditional distinction between high and low politics and creates a new political space in which health is
an overriding normative value and the ultimate goal of foreign policy
• Health is broadly conceived and encompasses the social determinants of health
• Is consistent with health discourses that focus on health as a human right and the “health for all” ideal
Remediation • Health’s rise as foreign policy issue reflects the continued persistence of the traditional hierarchy of foreign policy functions
• Health has become another issue that needs to be addressed through traditional approaches to foreign policy, or as a
strategic vehicle through which traditional foreign policy goals can be achieved
• Foreign policy attention on health is focused when disease crises appear and fades when crises drop off the political spotlight
•Provides the strongest explanation for why health has risen as a foreign policy issue
Regression
• Health’s integration into foreign policy is a regressive development – an indicator that health problems are getting worse
• The increasing attention paid to health across the functions of foreign policy signifies the failure of public health efforts
• Connecting health with the high politics of foreign policy threatens to tarnish long-standing associations of health with
normative values
• Public health’s wish for health to become more politically prominent may have come true but in a way that threatens what
was special about health in the first place
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the endorsement and approval of the UK strategy for an
interview were not successful.
Interviews took place between August 27, 2009 and
March 24, 2010. Six of the interviews with UK inter-
viewees were conducted in person in London and the
rest of the interviews were conducted by telephone. In-
terviews lasted from 30 minutes to 1.5 hours. Informed
consent was obtained before the interview began. Inter-
views were audio-taped and then transcribed verbatim.
Ethics approval was obtained from the University of
Ottawa renewed on an annual basis until the study was
completed and undertaken in full accordance with the
University’s ethical guidelines.
A general inductive approach was used to analyze the
interview data using manual coding [24]. Both the re-




















Figure 2 A Multiple Streams Model of Policymaking [22].readings and interpretations of the raw data (inductive)
guided data analysis. Data analysis encompassed three
concurrent and iterative flows of activities: data reduc-
tion, data display and conclusion drawing/verification.
The main themes in the data resulting from this process
are reported on in the results section of this article
within “why” and “how” categories consistent with the
research question followed by a discussion and analysis
of these themes using Fidler’s conceptualizations and
Kingdon’s model.
Results
Health is Global was released in 2008 largely in response
to globalization and the realization that ‘the old distinc-
tion between ‘over here’ and ‘over there’ was becoming
increasingly redundant’ and required nations to co-
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strategy’ to highlight the breadth of challenges that face
‘all of us’ in the area of global health [25].
Health is Global is intended to span five years (2008–
2013) however ‘its vision covers a 10-to 15-year period’
[1]. The strategy is comprised of goals with specific action
areas and includes ten principles that are meant to guide
decision-making particularly when conflicts among prior-
ities arise. Sir Liam Donaldson, Chief Medical Officer for
England and Dr. Nick Banatvala, Head of Global Affairs,
UK Department of Health, acknowledged in their proposal
for the strategy that potential conflicts exist between
policy priorities.
‘For example, reconciling UK trade interests (including
trade in commodities) with sound pro-poor development
policy and maintenance of international human rights
might be difficult…..A coherent UK global-health strategy
is important in navigating an economically and ethically
acceptable path through the priority areas’ [[26], p. 857].
The UK strategy’s final priorities and principles reflect
the potentially conflicting reasons why it was developed
and allude to the difficult process to reach a consensus
on what eventually ended up in it.
In general, interviewees described the strategy as a very
positive development referring to it as “motivational”, “a
commitment to global health”, and “more than just
another report”. Findings pertinent to how and why the
strategy was developed follow, beginning with a brief
overview of the British foreign policy from 1997 to 2008
that formed the backdrop to the strategy.
Why?
The late 1990s marked the beginning of an increasing
focus in the UK (and elsewhere) on the relationship be-
tween globalization and health with the UK’s Nuffield
Trust playing a key role in catalyzing attention on this
phenomenon and the importance of integrating health
into foreign policy. The late 1990s also marked the be-
ginning of Tony Blair’s premiership of the UK, a position
that he held from May 1997 to June 2007 after which
Gordon Brown became Prime Minister until 2010.
Three main foreign policies of Blair’s 10 year span as
UK’s Prime Minister were an activist philosophy of inter-
national interventionism,a maintaining strong alliances
with the United States (US) and a commitment to pla-
cing Britain at the heart of Europe [[27], p.3]. Activist
interventionism was regarded as a genuinely new per-
spective and approach, as was a focus on more ‘joined-
up-government’ [27]. Under Brown, some ‘recalibration’
of the three themes occurred but there was more con-
tinuity than change from Blair to Brown [[27], p.3]. Of
these three prongs, interventionism and the UK’s special
relationship with the US appear to be the most relevant
contextual factors that influenced why Health is Globalwas developed and what was included in it. A focus on
more ‘joined up government’ also helps explain why
Health is Global is a whole-of-government strategy.The Blair Administration
During the 1999 Kosovo crisis Blair delivered his famous
Chicago speech in which he unveiled his ‘doctrine of
international community’ [27]. This doctrine was based
on the explicit recognition that nations were becoming
interdependent and that national interest was to a sig-
nificant extent governed by international collaboration.
Mutual dependence was linked to the idea that boundar-
ies between the domestic and the foreign were blurring;
therefore, an overriding policy of non-intervention was
no longer an option. Indeed, in cases of genocide or
crimes against humanity, it was a moral imperative.
While initially expressed through a paradigm of hu-
manitarian intervention, after 9/11, Blair’s support for
interventionism became linked with protecting national
security, fighting terrorism and backing the US invasion
of Iraq based on evidence about weapons of mass de-
struction in Iraq that it now appears Blair knew to have
been fabricated [28]. This shift led critics to claim that
respect for human rights and international law were sub-
ordinated to the UK’s focus on its relationship with the
US and the ‘war on terror.’ Blair gave more attention to
international development in his second term, which
some argue was an effort to improve Britain’s tarnished
reputation post Iraq [27]. One of the UK interviewees
argued that Health is Global was in part politically moti-
vated to the same end:
“I think there was also, and I don’t know how much
this motivated the government, but I think because of
the opprobrium and the criticism of the UK
government’s positions on the Iraq war and so on, I
don’t know to what extent that might have influenced
them to try and see how they might get a better
international profile by focusing on positive
contributions the UK could make to strengthening
health and development”.
A 2006 commentary published in The Lancet highly
critical of the UK’s involvement in Iraq argued that ‘a
renewed foreign policy that might at least be one posi-
tive legacy of our misadventure in Iraq’ [[29], p. 1396]
was desperately needed. It concluded that health ‘is now
the most important foreign policy issue of our time and
should be used as an instrument of foreign policy’ [[29],
p. 1397]. How much this article or the perspective it
conveys influenced UK policymakers is not known. Its
arguments, however, are explicitly referred to in the pro-
posal that led to Health is Global, albeit without making
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factor [26].
The UK’s special relationship with the US may also
have sparked Health is Global ‘s development. The
US Institute of Medicine 1997 report, America’s Vital
Interest in Global Health, is listed as a key influence
and rationale for a government-wide strategy in the
proposal that led to the strategy. The US report ‘iden-
tified three pillars: protecting people, enhancing the
economy, and advancing international interests’ [[26],
p. 857], which eventually became the thematic back-
bone of Health is Global. One of the interviewees
also indicated that the Nuffield Trust’s relationship
with US colleagues in the American Association of
Academic Health Centers in the early 1990s was
another key development that attracted more focused
UK attention on the links between globalization and
health and the relationship between health and for-
eign policy. As this interviewee explained, “Basically the
Association wanted to know whether we would have a
continuing interest in working with the Americans on
matters of mutual interest and on the health agenda”.
Stemming from this initial discussion, the Nuffield Trust
began collaborating with the US on efforts to better
understand the impact of globalization on health, which
led to attempts to attract UK attention on this issue as
well.
While a more sophisticated understanding of global
health appeared to emerge during the Blair years, this
did not necessarily translate into action [30]. Public
health was not a dominant force in driving policy in the
UK and the overriding reason for focusing on health in
foreign policy was to protect national interest. Narrowly
focused domestic security concerns were key motivating
factors as seen in the emphasis given to bio-terrorism
and infectious diseases [30].
The Brown Administration
Gordon Brown’s government retained the broad
principle of interventionism but recast it to be less about
hard power and more about conflict prevention and hu-
manitarian agendas. He could not, however, completely
repudiate the exercise of military power at a time when
British troops were in both Afghanistan and Iraq, but he
did emphasize that military action in the future would
be a last resort [27]. In his speech to the Lord Mayor’s
banquet on November 12, 2007, Brown summarized his
approach as ‘hard-headed internationalism’ [[31], p. 15].
‘…internationalist because global challenges need global
solutions and nations must cooperate across borders-often
with hard-headed intervention-to give expression to our
shared interests and shared values; hard-headed because
we will not shirk from the difficult long term decisions
and because only through reform of our internationalrules and institutions will we achieve concrete, on-the-
ground results’ [[31], pp.15-16] [32].
Brown made it clear that the government’s primary
obligation is the safety of the British people and the pro-
tection of the British national interests that would, in an
interdependent world, be best realized through cooper-
ation to overcome shared challenges [[31], p.15]. Many
of these fundamental policy themes and the reasons
behind them (economic globalization) permeate Health
is Global.
In addition to traditional ‘high politics’ priority areas
and partners (the US), the Brown government continued
to promote international development. Over the course
of the Blair to Brown years, the Department for Inter-
national Development (DFID) enjoyed a reputation as a
progressive, innovative and effective donor agency with a
strong voice across government [33]. During that time,
British aid spending tripled in real terms and it plans to
spend 0.7% of gross national income on international de-
velopment by 2013 [1,33]. Brown himself assumed a key
leadership role in development efforts, including those
focused on health. In July 2007, he launched the Millen-
nium Development Goals (MDG) Call to Action along
with the UN Secretary General [1] and in September 2007
the International Health Partnership, a global compact
for achieving the health related MDGs [34]. Brown was
a strong proponent of Health is Global. In the July 2009
Department of International Development (DFID)’s white
paper he reiterated that even in tough economic times, ‘se-
curing global justice remains one of my top priorities,’
[[35], p. 5] and recommitted to keeping the UK’s promise
to support the realization of the MDGs.
The seeds for Health is Global were largely sown dur-
ing the Blair years but it was under Brown’s leadership
that the policy was launched.
‘Economic prosperity, security and stability for the UK and
the rest of the world’
The ultimate goal of the strategy is actually not global
health per se but rather ‘economic prosperity, security
and stability for the UK and the rest of the world’ [1]. As
it states:
‘a healthy population is fundamental to prosperity, se-
curity and stability - a cornerstone of economic growth
and social development. In contrast, poor health does
more than damage the economic and political viability
of any one country - it is a threat to the economic and
political interests of all countries’ [[1], p.7].
Based on this reasoning it appears that global health is
a means to an end and not an end in itself. Therefore,
‘improvements in the health of the UK and world’s
population’ through ‘greater coherence and consistency
between international policies that affect global health’
[1] are sub-objectives that support the overriding goal of
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preoccupations of foreign policymakers.
Globalization
Several interviewees referred to the recognition of the
important linkage between globalization and health as
the driving force behind the attention it garnered from
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in the early
millennium. “FCO was a key player in late 1990s/early
2000s in the context of globalization”. “Globalization”
required a “rethinking of how government works”, one in
which “you need a joined-up approach”. This ‘joined-up’
approach had already been established “under the New
Labour quite early on”. Another interviewee said that the
strategy development process:
“…looked at the whole issue and within that it became
clear that globalization had an important linkage with
global health such as communicable disease”.
As stated in the strategy, ‘safeguarding good health is
not simply the province of individual countries. A
globalised, interdependent world, characterized by the
increasing movement of individual and populations -
and where disease recognizes no borders - means that
health has become a global issue’ [[1], p.7]. But, as this
same interviewee added:
“…there were [also] opportunities clearly in healthcare
as a growth area in terms of business opportunities”.
“First it’s UK”
“I think it would be foolish not to admit that a large
part of it is done for UK benefit and that it has been
recognized that there are global threats. So first it’s UK
but longer-term benefits in terms of relationships and
protection from threats and so on. There is a need and
that runs through the development concept that it’s
about working with other countries to reduce the
global risk. The UK would want to protect its own
positions, its own population, by recognizing these
global threats”.
The most prevalent and strongest rationale for the de-
velopment of Health is Global is to benefit the UK. This
rationale is evident through the focus on global health
security (i.e. protecting the UK population from global
health threats) that permeates the strategy.
In the wake of the 2003 SARS pandemic, the need to
strengthen global health security and ‘ensure the safety’
[[1], p.3] of the UK population described as the ‘first
duty of any government’ [[1], p.3] was clearly a strong, if
not the strongest, rationale behind the development ofHealth is Global. As one interviewee put it, “we are
united when it comes to being secure in the UK”. This
focus is also a priority of the UK’s first ever national
security strategy also launched in 2008 [36]. There is
meant to be a ‘strong link’ [[1], p.15] between Health
is Global and the national security strategy that
includes the risk to the UK of diseases such as pan-
demic influenza along with international terrorism,
weapons of mass destruction, conflicts and failed
states [36,37].
While ‘global health security’ per se is not clearly
defined in the strategy, findings from the interviews sup-
port global health security as the driving force behind
the strategy. As one interviewee stated, “it does rather
focus on diseases crossing borders which is probably one
of the reasons it’s come to such a high profile”. Others
noted that “One of the things that we’ve done in the UK
is essentially accepted global health as the securitization
of the health agenda”. There was some support for this
perspective: “Development of sources or pockets of inse-
curity has led to, from my perspective, an equivocation
of global health to global health security”.
One interviewee talked at length about how “through
securitization health diplomats got into rooms that they
weren’t previously in”. He described this as “piggybacking”
on the securitization agenda to bring focus to global
health issues more generally.
“They (academic researchers) got invited to cabinet
committees to sit at tables with four-star generals in a
way that they weren’t able to previously- academic
researchers suddenly found that they could advocate
for research funding because they were talking about
things that might kill millions of people, like AIDS”.
While the majority of interviewees acknowledged
that global health security was the main motivating
factor behind the strategy, several of the non-state
interviewees were highly critical of this positioning.
One stated:
“I know why they’re doing it, for government buy-in,
but it’s not enough to think of health as a foreign
policy as global security. With this global security
thing you get governments who are in it for
themselves”.
Another commented that:
“The security of health agenda has gone unchecked
and unchallenged because too many people have too
much to gain from it. I’m not saying it’s a bad thing
but I’m not sure it’s not the great thing that we’re
making it out to be”.
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health security, namely its potentially uneasy and
conflicting relationship to global health equity. As one
interviewee stated, “There are a lot of unaltruistic drivers
of the development of the securitization of health
agenda and one of these is the diminution of the health
equity agenda”.
Although strengthening global health security, primar-
ily as a way to keep the UK population safe, was the
main rationale for its development, two other reasons
were also cited (apart from the strategy functioning to
deflect criticism from Blair’s Iraq debacle).
First, as one interviewee commented, the UK’s trad-
itional “colonial” approach to foreign policy means it
likes to be seen as a leader on the global stage and will
do things in order to protect that reputation. Another
interviewee stated that it was very “disappointing” that the
UK did not sign onto the Oslo Ministerial Declaration.
The comment was also made, “it’s so typical UK – have
still got this old colonial, oh, we’re so great and think that
we can go it alone”. In the same vein, “there was this thing
that the UK still likes to see itself as a leader in things
whether it is or not. That we must lead in global health.
So the UK will do things in order to lead”. The proposal
for the government-wide strategy also alludes to UK
leadership as one of the driving forces behind it, ‘the
UK has been at the forefront of multilateral initiatives,
such as cancelling the debt for poor countries, access
to medicines…the 2005 UK presidency of the Group of 8
wealthiest nations (G8) drew attention to global health,
climate change, investment in health systems, and part-
nerships with government of developing countries’ [[26],
p. 859]. Health is Global was seen as a logical extension of
the UK’s leadership in global health.
Second, the strategy was developed in part to enhance
UK business opportunities overseas in the context of
globalization. ‘Health as a commodity’ was identified as
one of the main reasons for developing the government-
wide strategy in 2007 [[26], p. 858]. Indeed, harnessing
‘the force of globalization’ is largely about trade and
investment opportunities for the UK, although in
doing so it is also regarded as a way to improve global
health and access to care and services for the ‘poorest
people in the world [[26], p. 858]. One interviewee
commented that, “you have UK companies looking to
win business overseas” and another who said “there
were opportunities clearly in healthcare as a growth
area in terms of business opportunities”. The strategy
seeks to enhance ‘the UK as a market leader in well-
being, health services and medical products (including
pharmaceutical and medical devices)’ including the
priority to promote the ‘best of British healthcare’ both
because it can contribute to strengthening health
systems in other countries and also because it canbring ‘significant benefits for the UK economy’ [[1],
p.29] [[38], pp.66-67].For the benefit of others
Other rationales focused more on contributing to im-
proving health and prosperity outside the UK as a goal
in its own right. As stated in the foreword by the Prime
Minister, ‘the strategy is one way for us in Britain to
build a stronger, fairer world’ [[1], p.3]. Along with
global health being a question of security, it is also a
question of ‘morality’ and is defined in the foreword as a
‘force for good’ [[1], p.3].
As several interviewees described, Health is Global
stems in part from the UK’s focus on development that
became a more prominent part of the government’s
agenda under Tony Blair. A separate Department of
International Development (DFID) was created in the
late 1990s and several policies that focused on the UK’s
role in international development were released [38].
“There was a genuine interest in development in the
government in the late 1990s and a growing concern
about inequalities”, said one interviewee. The strategy it-
self comments that ‘improving health and reducing
health inequalities requires tackling the underlying
causes of ill health- the conditions in which people live
and inequalities in the resources and opportunities to
which they have access’ [[1], p.19]. It commits the UK to
working with ‘the WHO, the EU and others to take for-
ward key recommendations from the WHO Commission
on Social Determinants of Health and ensure that
actions to address these issues remains high on the
international agenda’ [[1], p.19].
A few interviewees frequently linked the concept of
“health equity” with that of “development”. As one
noted, “In the UK we talk about development rather
than equity”. Another commented, “I don’t see equity
being a central concept in the policy discourse. It’s in a
larger concept of development, which is then unpacked
in various ways but I think very much informed by the
neo-liberal premise”.b One interviewee noted that the
“equity lens is not fundamental. It’s just part of the
discourse - part of the mix”, which another noted was
placed and kept on the agenda by non-state actors:
“activists, essentially, of one sort or another”. These
comments downplay the importance of the health equity
argument and are interesting because promoting health
equity and reducing health inequalities is a fairly prom-
inent concept throughout the strategy. One of the
strategy’s ten principles explicitly refers to the import-
ance of promoting equity within and between countries
[1]. As well, health impact assessments are included in
the strategy as a recommended approach to assessing
the equity impact of domestic and foreign policy [38].
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egy may well reflect the work and determination of a
few strong non-state actors in the policymaking process.
As one non-state interview noted, “I had to fight so hard
to get human rights and health equity in it. They only
play this card when it suits them”. This interviewee ex-
panded further on this viewpoint, “they don’t really be-
lieve in equity either. Again it’s good when they want to
score brownie points or something but if it means they
are going to have to give over sacrificing something
they’re not interested”.
While some interviewees expressed doubt as to the
strategy’s commitment to global health equity, Health is
Global nonetheless commits to investing in development.
It aims to complement and build on DFID strategies by
including actions focused on combating poverty and
health inequalities in support of the MDGs and improving
the social determinants of health in impoverished nations
[1]. One interviewee praised the government’s commit-
ment to development saying, “I think the British govern-
ment … has been very proactive … partly because civil
society [was] onto it straight away, in saying we will keep
our overseas development commitments”.
Part of the rationale behind supporting development
for health is based on the premise that ‘a healthy popula-
tion is fundamental to prosperity, security and stability’
[[1], p.14]. Quoting the WHO Commission on Macro-
economics and Health (2001), the strategy reiterates that
‘ill health is a drain on society, while good health is a
cornerstone of economic growth and social development
in developing countries’ [[1], p. 14]. Taking this one step
further, the strategy also asserts that in the context of
globalization, poor health ‘does more than damage the
economic and political variability of any one country - it
is a threat to the economic and political interests of all
countries’ [[1], p. 7]. While the development rationale is
primarily about what the UK can do to help developing
nations through trade and economic growth, it also in-
cludes elements of self-interest. As one stated, “security
is now more centrally part of it (i.e. the reason for
investing in global health)”, not development.
Human rights also figure in the strategy and its devel-
opment. Donaldson argued that one of the reasons the
UK must engage with the global health agenda through
the establishment of a coherent global health strategy is
because ‘health is a human right’ [39]. The right to
health underpins the ten principles included in Health is
Global. The strategy highlights that the UK was one of
the original 1948 signatories of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights but does not make any additional ref-
erences to its specific obligations under international hu-
man rights covenants. Having said this, Health is Global
does commit to including health as a section in the
government’s annual human rights report [1]. It alsomakes some explicit references to human rights with an
emphasis on gender rights in the context of sexual and
reproductive health and cautions that unfair or unethical
trade can deprive workers of their ‘rights to security of
employment and compensation’ [[1], p.60].
Of the 14 UK interviewees interviewed, five did not
make any reference to human rights, and only two men-
tioned international human rights frameworksc in their
response. The majority of those who referred to human
rights did so simply to affirm that human rights had
been a consideration in the development of Health is
Global. These comments embody the normative but not
the legal dimensions of international human rights,
which is consistent with how state actors tend to regard
human rights as a rationale for focusing on health in
foreign policy [37,40]. Only one interviewee explicitly
referred to health as a “right” while others referred to
concepts related to human rights such social justice and
improving global health as an obligation. A prominent
theme in the interview data was challenges associated
with ensuring that a human rights perspective had an
equal seat at the table in policy discussions along with
trade, economic growth and security.Influences from outside government
The Nuffield Trust played a key role in bringing the
issue of the effects of globalization on health and HiFP
to UK policymakers’ attention beginning in the later
1990s and early 2000s. As one interviewee explained,
“the idea came a long time ago from outside government”,
in particular from the Nuffield Trust and “from people
with academic interest in global health diplomacy and
the emerging concept of global health diplomacy”. The
Nuffield Trust funded leading scholars to generate crit-
ical academic research as evidence in this area and
used its position to build extensive networks of senior
level officials engaged in health as a foreign policy
issue [41].
Other members of civil society also appeared to play an
influencing role in establishing the need for a greater focus
on global health by state policymakers. As one interviewee
commented, “I think civil society has definitely had an
influence through campaigns like Make Poverty History”.
The UK had played a leading role in launching the Make
Poverty History campaign in 2005 which challenged the
2005 G8 Summit in Gleneagles to tackle issues of trade,
aid and debt [42].
Developments in the international community that
focused on health and foreign policy, in particular the
publication of the Oslo Ministerial Declaration in 2007
also played a role. As one interviewee stated, these
developments exerted “international pressure” on the
UK “to get in the game”, though as already noted, and as
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alone”. Another interviewee reflected:
“So you have countries putting their stamp on their
field saying this is what we understand by it. To me
that raises the significance of a policy area, that when
more than one state starts to do it then it becomes
important for the UK to have its version of this
discourse because it’s achieving a degree of
international prominence”.Influences from inside government
The intent to put in place a whole-of-government ap-
proach to addressing global health was a major force be-
hind its development. As one interviewee put it,
“another thing to bear in mind with New Labour is the
greater focus on government coherence, joined-up pol-
icies. It’s also important to see this as a driver for looking
at how one policy area can impact on another”. As the
strategy states:
‘Many UK government departments and agencies work
on issues that directly or indirectly affect the health of
the world’s population. To be most effective in our work
on global health, and to make the most of opportunities
to improve UK health, we need a consistent and joined-
up approach across government’ [[1] p. 15].
An important factor that influenced and enabled the
development of the strategy was the political support it
had from the Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, and his
Ministers of the day. Brown signed the foreword demon-
strating “support from number 10”. Another interviewee
reflected that Brown likely supported the strategy out of
personal conviction:
“…he’s committed the government to getting up to the
UN target of 0.7% of GDP, he’s created this new
financial vehicle for vaccinations and immunizations
so he himself would seem very supportive of global
health but has that been done for foreign policy
reasons or because it happens to be his personal
conviction? I don’t think he’s doing this in a major way
for foreign policy objectives but out of personal
conviction”.
Ministerial support for the strategy reflected in a com-
mon voice and position across government was also crit-
ical and appears to have been a significant enabling
factor leading to its development and eventual launch.
Ministers that were the leads on collaborating to develop
the strategy were present at its launch. The press release
that accompanied the launch included quotes from each
of them [25,43]. This demonstrated as one interviewee
put it, “that the baseline was all signed up to this. Thatis why we have an HMG (Her Majesty’s Government)
document”. Another reflected that:
“…one of the things that I’ve learned working in
government is that conducive personalities are the
biggest driver for change. One minister getting on with
another minister across the pond will do more for
catalyzing or evolving a policy area or an agreement
between countries than years and years of careful
negotiation and planning”.
As several interviewees communicated, the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office (FCO) was a key player in
the late 1990s/early 2000s in bringing attention across
government to the rising significance of health in foreign
policy. It also played a major role in ensuring that
Health is Global was developed and launched. “FCO ran
a series of workshops on a kind of interface of health
and foreign policy that helped open a few doors to the
strategy actually being published, to get the conversation
going with FCO at an institutional level”. Several inter-
viewees noted that “FCO support was key” and that
there was a “push within government from a powerful
part of government - FCO - to see this delivered”.
“It would have been difficult to have seen this thing
delivered if it simply came from the Department of
Health. The strategy was led principally by the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office. They discussed this in the
context of globalization and how the UK should
respond to it and there was agreement from that that
one of the deliverables could be setting out what our
global health policy-strategic approach could be and
this dovetailed very nicely with what people were
saying on the outside”.
Several interviewees commented that there would not
be a strategy without the lead public servant, Dr. Nick
Banatvala, in the Department of Health (DH) who kept
it moving forward. “There was a very, very committed
individual in international health who was a dynamo,
very, very brilliant and even when the time is right if you
don’t have an individual, a sort of champion, then some-
times you don’t get things done”. Dr. Banatvala was
described as the “real hero”. His understanding of the
NGO world from which he came and his previous work
with DFID were seen as critical to his success. He was
also a medical doctor. It appears that Dr. Banatvala was
successful in moving the strategy along not only because
he was from the bureaucracy where “it really happens”
but also because he had experience in and understand-
ing of the different worlds, players and issues that
needed to be integrated into the strategy. Another very
important support for the lead public servant was
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inside government and for networking”.
How?
Policy development process
In 2007, The Prime Minister and Cabinet approved
Donaldson’s Health is Global: Proposals for a UK
Government-wide Strategy discussion paper, which set
out the rationale for a strategic framework for global
health [[1] p. 15]. The DH led an interministerial working
group that coordinated the development of the strategy,
and in July 2007, several government departments, includ-
ing FCO, DFID and Defense, and devolved administra-
tions joined forces with The Lancet, the London School of
Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and the Royal College of
Surgeons of Edinburgh to host workshops with a wide
range of stakeholders to debate what the UK government
strategy should say [44]. Those developing the strategy
also received written responses captured through the
Health is Global website and reviewed commentaries
published in health and medical journals about health and
foreign policy. The results of the stakeholder workshop
discussion were also published on the website and used to
help shape the strategy. The interministerial working
group for Health is Global oversaw the organization of
these workshops, which aimed to involve the UKs
devolved administrations in the process and a wide range
of stakeholders from private, public and civil sectors, in-
cluding those from the healthcare system, health insurance
industry, academic and research organizations, the media,
global health charities, health professional associations
and advocacy groups [44].
Interviewees described the strategy development process
as “an extensive exercise of consulting and getting feed-
back” that took about two years to complete. “It was clear
how vast the agenda was”, said another. The process
included a “cross-government priority mapping” exercise
that “helped crystallize who was coming from what
perspective”. As one non-state interviewee commented, “a
lot of us learned a lot about how government works and
in a way just that process itself was an important outcome.
We got to know each other’s business”.
In addition to the development of background papers
and stakeholder consultations, the policy development
process also considered relevant research evidence. This
evidence focused on the major causes of death and ill
health in the world using data from the 2006 Global
Burden of Disease and Risk Factors study and the 2006
Disease Control Priorities in Developing Countries
report (DCP2) [38]. The findings from both reports
appear to have informed a number of objectives and
action areas in the strategy, including ensuring stronger,
fairer and safer systems to deliver health and related
actions such as focusing on non-communicable diseaseand injuries and identifying and supporting research and
innovation that tackle global health priorities. The strategy
also refers to both peer and non-peer reviewed literature
and findings of important and relevant commissions such
as the WHO Commission on the Social Determinants of
Health, the WHO Commission on Macroeconomics and
Health and the Codex Alimentarius Commission. One
might conclude from this that there was significant atten-
tion paid to research evidence in the development of the
strategy and in the final product. Interviewees, particularly
those from the academic community and research organi-
zations, tell a different story. While these interviewees
acknowledged that there were deliberate efforts to involve
academics and other sorts of researchers in the process
because it was recognized that “there needed to be more
evidence”, evidence was only one of many factors consid-
ered in strategy deliberations alongside politics, ideology
and values.
“The drivers are not necessarily that you’ve got a body
of evidence why global health is important.
Globalization is changing the context of health and
that’s a general body of evidence. There’s a political
and discursive element to this as much as an
evidence-based one. It will always be couched as
evidence based because that is the main legitimating
discourse for policy innovation in the UK”.
One interviewee stated, “My personal take is that
there’s kind of a political rationale that’s important in
understanding why this has happened rather than [it]
being evidence based. To the extent that it is evidence
based, its evidence of emerging infectious diseases”.
Another commented:
“How do you start thinking about evidence based
policy for trade, for example, when it is such a
political topic? I mean there’s an evidence base for
pandemics because they’re the more scientific things
but its other things even the climate change stuff that
we’re just starting to do. So a lot of it is based on
consensus, not evidence”.
This particular interviewee also reflected on how evi-
dence could be used going forward as the policy is being
implemented:
“My own ideal would be to have evidence collated now
to develop policy further as well as supporting policy
that exists…to be honest, it … could have done so
much more in that section about the research and how
research would be used to improve policy for the future
and give a state of the art – where we are now and
where do we need to get to”.
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one of the lead public servants provided another point
of view:
“At one stage we had quite a difficult time with some
of those researchers because they felt that the
document as a sort of earlier iteration was not
sufficiently evidence based and there lies a tension
between policymakers and researchers. ‘You’re
identifying these four priority areas. Where’s the
evidence for that?’ There is time when you accept that
you take the evidence as it is and you move forward
on a particular piece of policy”.
Reconciling differences
Developing Health is Global and agreeing on a final
product required significant consensus building and
reconciliation of differences and interests across the
many players involved. Moreover, the government of the
day had committed to seeing the strategy developed so a
“certain degree of pragmatism” was required to ensure a
final product was arrived at in a timely manner. Early on
in the policy process it was acknowledged that there
were potential conflicts between the priorities that were
emerging and that there might be difficulty reconciling
UK trade interests with sound development policy
[26,45]. Indeed, enhancing the ability to reconcile differ-
ences across government in the area of global health
through a whole-of-government approach was one of
the reasons the policy was developed in the first place
[39]. As a way to reduce policy conflicts, in the strategy
the Department of Health committed to supporting
other departments in preparing global health impact
assessments of their foreign and domestic policies [1].
According to several of the interviewees, the process
of developing the strategy did indeed advance under-
standing about global health and the reconciliation of
potential differences in this domain:
“I guess one of the useful things that’s come out of this
is that we’ve been able to improve discussions between
…across government on what the different elements
and issues are that intersect global health and then try
to iron out what has been, at times, glaring
contradictions in policy positions”.
The process of ironing out contradictions and differ-
ences was clearly not an easy one, with the majority of
interviewees describing it as difficult and requiring
significant compromise to arrive at a final document:
“It’s tough because our government doesn’t think the
same on anything and each department has its own
priorities and mandates so trying to get somethingthat all would sign-off on including the PM was a big
challenge. So he (the lead from the Department of
Health) took stuff out”.
Another commented, “I think it shows a bit of a tussle
that it had to settle in order to be written. It had to settle
for a slightly narrower definition of health”. Others
described a “push and pull” process, “huffing and puffing
over drafts” and being involved in interactions that
“weren’t altogether as productive as they might have
been” resulting in a product that “wasn’t truly a joint
production”. Another commented that the “broad tone
is collegial and amicable but it’s too far to say it’s
consensual, there were very definite trade-offs”.
Interviewees provided significant insight into the
trade-offs as well as to the power struggles that took
place among government players. As one interviewee
noted, “DFID is like an NGO in government. The
powerful are trade, industry, FCO”. In keeping with the
traditional ‘high politics’ areas of foreign policy, this
comment likely explains what priorities rose to the top
and received the greatest profile in the strategy (security
and trade) as compared to those that received less (social
determinants of health, health as a human right).
Two main areas that required negotiation and com-
promise were clear in an analysis of the interview data.
First, as one of the comments in the previous paragraph
highlights, there was a lack of consensus as to what
global health actually is. For example, there were those
who regarded global health as primarily about diseases
that cross borders (e.g. Health Protection Agency) and
others who regarded it as being much broader and also
encompassing the social determinants of health (e.g.
Department of Health International Unit, DFID, NGO
interviewees). As one interviewee explained:
“The policy community that focuses on global health is
very, very small. You’re basically talking about one
unit of a unit within the Department of Health. I think
not more than half a dozen middle-ranking civil
servants in DFID, and I’d be surprised if we’ve got half
a dozen people in FCO who have a specific portfolio
brief for global health. To them global health means
all the things that have been before, special health
regulations, but also trade and IP, migration policy
and health – outside that group of people, global
health is equated to health security”.
To resolve this issue, it appears that the players agreed
to settle on what one interviewee called a “slightly
narrower definition of health”, couched primarily within
the rubric of global health security.
Second, as anticipated when the strategy was first
under discussion, there were significant debates related
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UK as a market leader in well-being, health services and
medical products’ on the one hand while ‘promoting
access to medicines’ [1] on the other. In other words
there were conflicts between priorities that would
primarily benefit the UK and certain interests within the
UK (e.g. trade, security) versus those that were meant to
primarily benefit others (e.g. development, human
rights). Several themes in the interview data elucidate
this struggle further.
The first example has to do with international trade in
conventional arms, which is a significant issue given the
UK is one of the world’s largest arms exporters [37]. As
an interviewee from FCO said:
“There are certainly a lot of civil society organizations
saying if you are serious about improving global
health outcomes, you should be tackling the arms
industry. Now that takes us into very, very sensitive
territory for FCO because you know, automatically
there are going to be conflicting interests at play”.
A few other interviewees also commented on the arms
issue with one indicating that “there were some pretty
robust discussions between the Ministry of Defense,
Department of Health and the Foreign Office around
what our global health strategy would mean to things
like arms agreements”. Another added:
“I remember at one point we had a discussion of arms
and how you know, how the arms industry was going
to be integrated into all this and accepting that
countries have a right to defend themselves but
nevertheless, some arms exports end up in regimes
which are unsavory, to say the least. I think that
report rather dodged around that kind of issue”.
This interviewee is likely referring to the section of the
strategy in which the UK calls for a legally binding treaty
for the international trade in conventional arms without
impinging on ‘legitimate, responsible defense exports’
[[38], p. 21]. What this means exactly is not elaborated
on in the strategy but it can be assumed that “dodging
the issue” through lack of clarity and the use of diplo-
matic language was perhaps the only way that relevant
government departments would collectively sign off on
this content in the strategy.
Another concern that at least half of the interviewees
mentioned relates to the issue of advancing UK as a
market leader in health and supporting UK industries
abroad while at the same time also aiming to reduce
health inequalities through, for example, contributions
to improving health systems and access to medicine and
technology in low and middle income countries. Whilethe previous example brought in FCO, Defense and
Health, comments about this issue focused primarily on
conflicting priorities across DFID and the Department of
Health. As one interviewee stated, “part of the DH role
is to act as a sponsor for the UK health economy and
you’ve got Trade and Industry which are responsible for
trade promotion. DFID has been working on access to
medicines so you can infer a potential kind of conflict
there”. Another elaborated further:
“When you look at trade and intellectual property
issues, DFID would always say, well, look, what can
we do for the developing world? And when that comes
into conflict with actually what might be most
beneficial for UK companies in terms of how they can
get stronger intellectual property protection globally,
DFID will not soften its stance which would be at odds
with what other departments are doing, say the
Department of Health which is the lead sponsor
department for the pharmaceutical industry within
government and would want to pursue a policy
position that government would be sympathetic to
industry”.
As an interviewee from DFID emphasized:
“The thing that drives us and drives most development
agencies are the MDGs. That’s our focus, that’s our
mission. That will drive things first and then we will
try to align with other domestic partners. Our first
and foremost objective is reducing poverty. That comes
before anything else”.
One interviewee provided significant insight into the
nature of the discussions that took place to hash out
these sorts of conflicts and expressed some frustration
with the DFID position. These comments also highlight
that one of the positive aspects of going through the
process of developing a strategy was the opportunity to
hold discussions about contentious issues since it was
imperative that a strategy be agreed upon and launched.
“There were times when we got to air some intellectual
laundry that we never, never got to in public or private
between ourselves before. I remember one particular
exchange when we wanted issues related to medical
devices, the pharmaceutical industry, the
biotechnology industry, wanted all three of those
approaches to get into the chapter and so we sat down,
we had a meeting and agreed to the points we wanted
to make and I went away and produced a draft. We
shared it with our colleagues in DFID and it’s not to
say that there was ever any kind of intention of
fighting but their comments displayed naiveté about
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generation for the UK and they’d state, which is true,
our department can’t support priorities which are
about the UK getting richer. And we’d say, well, we
understand that this isn’t DFID speaking, this is the
UK government. It’s part of the kind of mentality that
happens with all governments. It was frustrating that
certain departments and certain colleagues still didn’t
make the intellectual leap required to have a joined-
up piece”.
When asked how these sorts of issue were eventually
resolved so the strategy could be written, this inter-
viewee said, “That particular chapter ended up being
compromised and shrunk in size, unfortunately”. It also
appears that there was an agreement between DFID and
DH that the strategy would reiterate DFID’s commit-
ment to working with ‘the poorest countries in the
world’ [[38] p.58] while DH would concentrate on
middle income and emerging countries, such as Brazil,
India and China [1].
Another interviewee provided some additional thoughts
on how tensions were resolved during the policy develop-
ment process:
“I think there was a group of people who have a
particular priority focus but who fundamentally have
the same values and therefore discussion and re-
discussion and redrafting and ensuring that the text
reflected the commitments of the department
whichever department you came from was not a
completely painless process but it was done in a
number of iterations to ensure that all stakeholders
were content. And I think that was a critical part of
ensuring that the strategy itself was actually accepted”.
Despite the contentious issues that arose during the
process and trade-offs and compromises that were
required to “all meet in the middle”, the majority of
interviewees were satisfied with the final product. The
process of developing it was seen as beneficial in achiev-
ing greater cross government understanding of issues
and policy positions.
Policy implementation process
The strategy includes a detailed implementation plan with
specific actions each with an assigned lead department(s).
An interministerial group made up of representatives
from the departments involved in the development of
the strategy (DH, Defense, DFID, FCO) is responsible
for implementing the strategy and monitoring progress
[1]. A cross-government steering group of senior official
supports the interministerial group [1]. Actions it is
taking to ensure partner involvement include regularpartner events to review global health challenges and to
assess whether the strategy is making an impact [38].
The strategy did not commit new resources to support
implementation but rather reiterated the relevant re-
sources that it had already committed to global health,
particularly those for international development fun-
neled through DFID. The strategy also emphasized that
existing resources from other government departments
are important and that ‘these resources need to be used
strategically if they are to have maximum impact. This
means supporting the priorities and approaches set out
in the strategy and working with others to deliver them’
[[1], p. 33].
One area of new investment included in the strategy
pertains to the global health security priority. While
details of the level of funding and which department is
contributing to it are not provided, the strategy commits
to ‘new funding for the HPA (Health Protection Agency)
to do more work internationally’ [[1], p. 21] and support
for a new Chatham House Centre on Global Health and
Foreign Policy [38]. This investment demonstrates the
importance of the strategy’s global health security prior-
ity. In addition, the strategy also commits to providing
funding for the new European Council on Global Health
that aims to strengthen the European voice in global
health governance and be a powerful advocate for a sus-
tainable European commitment to global health. At the
time this study was undertaken, Global Health Europe
Task Force members included Dr. Nick Banatvala, who
led the development of Health is Global, and Dr. David
Heymann, Director of the Centre for Global Health
Security at Chatham House [1,46,47].
Several interviewees mentioned the role of Chatham
House in helping to implement the strategy. Most con-
sidered this to be highly positive given its long standing
reputation as a ‘world-leading source of independent
analysis, informed debate and influential ideas’ about
international and global issues [48]. One interviewee
from an NGO, however, was highly critical of this move,
arguing that Chatham House has no experience in
health and its focus on global health security as opposed
to health equity was a “cop-out”.
The Health is Global strategy set out a set of actions
against which indicators would be developed and pro-
gress measured. It committed to reviewing progress
regularly ‘to improve the way we are working,’ [[1], p. 16]
and overall impact at the end of the life of the strategy to
determine what to do next [1]. As part of the evaluation
process, it would commission annual independent reviews
on progress on particular aspects of the strategy with a full
review in 2013. It is not clear if such reviews have indeed
been annual as only one such review conducted in June
2010 is publicly available [49]. It does appear, however,
that the interministerial group is tracking progress on a
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partner meetings held at Chatham House and in partner
newsletters [50,51]. Furthermore, the UK government
launched a Health is Global outcomes framework in
2011 [52]. Starting with the original strategy and the
recommendations from the first independent review
just mentioned, the government developed an outcomes
framework to support the next phase of the strategy.
This framework reaffirms the guiding principles and
focuses efforts towards achieving a consolidated set of
twelve high-level global health outcomes by 2015 that
will be underpinned across government by departments’
own delivery plans.
Interviewees provided their perspectives both on what
impact they thought the strategy has had so far as well
as perspectives on success going forward. Overall, inter-
viewees regardless of sector described the strategy as a
positive and important milestone, particularly because it
focused minds in a “more consistent way” across govern-
ment, has been a “good driver” for individual and col-
lective work because it is now “written down” and serves
as a guide for identifying “how each department fits and
where the gaps are”. It was also described as a concrete
example of the UK’s commitment to global health,
“sticking our flag in the sand is a successful output” said
one. Several mentioned what they regarded as concrete
positive outcomes of the strategy so far, including the
launch of the research program at Chatham House and
new funding for the Health Protection Agency. Another
commented that the strategy is making a difference
because it “builds awareness and support for the MDGs”.
A few interviewees nonetheless remained querulous
about the strategy’s impact:
“Has the government kept to it? Is the government who
signed onto it keeping to it? What has this strategy led
to that would not have happened anyway?”
And:
“Success will be what happens to the policy community
around this. Will there be greater interaction between
FCO, DFID and Health? Greater cooperation?
Genuine engagement?”
Discussion
The importance of actors and leaders
Different types of actors played a significant role in in-
fluencing the creation of Health is Global and ensuring
that it was developed, launched and implemented.
The policy community
While Health is Global was launched in 2008, the policy
community had been actively influencing its eventualdevelopment for at least a decade earlier. The Nuffield
Trust, in particular, played a major role in attracting and
sustaining focus and analytical scrutiny on the link
between globalization and health and, with partners, in
connecting the various players in the policy community
(e.g. government, academia, think tanks). This leading
and connecting role is critical to preventing the frag-
mentation of the community and the policy alternatives
it espouses, which can significantly weaken such a
community’s clout as influencers in the process [21]. A
more closely knit policy community can generate con-
sistent ways of thinking, common language and issue
framing, all of which are important to softening up a
policy space and stabilizing a policy system to influence
change. That Health is Global was framed according to
recommendations stemming from the Nuffield Trust led
processes indicates that this policy community had an
impact.
Government actors are part of policy communities
and in the UK case the most prominent of these were
FCO, DH and DFID. Whether actors from these three
sectors considered themselves to be part of the same
policy community during the policy development
process is not known, although given the significant con-
sensus building that was required to arrive at an agreed
upon strategy, likely they did not. Instead, as several
interviewees described, the policy development process
itself brought departments with disparate views closer
together creating somewhat of a closer knit policy com-
munity in government.
An interesting observation stemming from the inter-
view data pertains to the somewhat tense interactions
that academics who contributed to the process had with
government policymakers. On the one hand, academics
thought that there needed to be a greater focus on gath-
ering and scrutinizing evidence to inform the policy,
while on the other, the policymakers were focused on
being pragmatic and moving forward with whatever evi-
dence they had on hand. This tension is not surprising
and is supported by ample literature about the chal-
lenges associated with the evidence-informed policy and
decision making processes [53-59].
It appears, then, that while there was representation
and participation from the academic community in the
Health is Global process this does not necessarily go
hand in hand with the conclusion that research evidence
played a central role in influencing policy decisions.
Drawing on conclusions derived from the application of
Kingdon’s model, policy is primarily the result of politics,
policy entrepreneurs and the convergence of the three
streams and not the result of research evidence per se.
The interview data corroborates this conclusion. To re-
peat one particularly relevant comment, “my personal
take is that there’s kind of a political rationale that’s
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rather than being evidence based. To the extent that it is
evidence-based, it’s evidence of emerging infectious
diseases”. This comment resonates with Labonté’s argu-
ment that technical evidence, especially about risk and
pandemic preparedness, may have traction in global
health policymaking as it aligns with the health security
focus, but rarely is there a full consensus on evidence
with respect to other global health areas such as aid and
development, leading to a significant amount of political
interpretation [60].
Policy entrepreneurs
According to Kingdon’s model, policy change cannot
take place without leadership from tenacious policy en-
trepreneurs [21]. In the UK case a policy entrepreneur
played the key leadership role in advancing policy direc-
tions. While such entrepreneurs do not necessarily need
to be politicians or public servants, based on the find-
ings from this study (including the three background
cases not reported on in this article) leaders in GHD
processes appear to possess at least two special attri-
butes. First, they are either politicians or senior public
servants, and second, they encompass both health and
international relations expertise through formal training
and/or education or a combination of the two. Three of
the four leaders in the case studies (including the three
background cases) were medical doctors who could call
upon their status as the elite profession within health, as
needed. Despite their authority and influence, however,
policy entrepreneurs cannot be successful unless they
have backing of those from the highest level of political
power. In the UK case, Prime Minister Brown was
personally committed to Health is Global. Support from
“number 10” was viewed as essential for the process to
succeed. Similar political support and policy leadership
from the very top was seen as necessary for the policy
directions taken in the background cases.
According to Kingdon, policy entrepreneurs play the
key role in ‘softening up’ the system and linking the
problem, policy and politics streams. One way in which
they do this is by developing their ideas and proposals in
advance of when a policy window may open. This was
indeed what happened in the process leading up to
Health is Global. “The real hero” as one interviewee
called him, Dr. Bantavala, contributed to the precursor
proposal, a summary of which was published in The
Lancet [26].
World Health Organization (WHO)
At about the same time that the UK released Health is
Global, it also published a UK Institutional Strategy that
will guide and frame its work with the WHO. The UK’s
WHO strategy is a joint strategy of the health,international development and foreign affairs depart-
ments. The strategy coheres with Health is Global and
sets how the UK and WHO will work together most
effectively to support the goals and objectives of the UK
government and of the WHO [61]. This strategy and the
multiple references that Health is Global makes to the
priority that the UK places on working with and
strengthening the WHO to advance global health objec-
tives is consistent with findings from the background
cases.
The UK WHO strategy acknowledges that as a ‘major
force for good in global public health,’ [[61], p.6] the
WHO is at the heart of responding to global health chal-
lenges, is responsible for providing leadership in global
health matters and is also a key development partner for
delivering on the MDGs [61]. The UK acknowledges that
the WHO as an institutional actor in the context of
globalization plays a major role in helping them to
cooperate to achieve common global health objectives.
While self-interest prevails as the main reason that
states like the UK are developing strategic approaches to
investing in global health, acknowledging that the WHO
is an important and relevant actor, though also in need
of significant reform [62-64], signals that negotiation
and consensus building to improve population health
both within and across states is both necessary and
possible.The importance of timing and stream alignment
Timing and the alignment of the problem, policy and
politics streams found in Kingdon’s model were critical
to the eventual development and government-wide
agreement on Health is Global. The growing awareness
of global health and the potentially important relation-
ship between health and foreign policy (part of the pol-
icy stream) had been brewing for several years in the UK
policy community before the SARS crisis hit as the
“wake-up call” for the government to take concrete
action. While SARS was what Kingdon would call the
‘focusing event,’ (a component of the problem stream)
there also appeared to be political motivation - to im-
prove the UK’s global reputation post Iraq. Investing in
global health was arguably one potential way to do this.
The UK’s commitment at the time to helping to achieve
the MDGs (another aspect of the problem stream) was
also a strong motivating factor for focusing on global
health. Within this mix of policy, problems and politics,
leaders within the bureaucracy (policy entrepreneurs)
had set the stage for catalyzing stream alignment when
the policy window opened with the SARS crisis. A band-
wagon effect occurred at that point in time that and
created incentives for the various government actors
with non-state actor participation to arrive at an
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the Health is Global strategy.
Revolution? remediation? regression? - self-interest
dominates
Findings in the UK case lead to the conclusion that
Health is Global was developed primarily to benefit the
UK. Such self-interest is reflected in the strategy’s focus
on global health security, the priority the strategy places
on capitalizing on global health as a business opportun-
ity and the revelation that the strategy was likely devel-
oped in part to improve the UK’s global reputation that
had been tarnished as a result of its involvement in Iraq.
These observations align with Fidler’s remediation
conceptualization, that the strategy is using global health
to further other traditional foreign policy goals. In con-
trast to the revolution conceptualization, health is not
an overriding normative goal of foreign policy but rather
a means to an end.
While “First it’s UK” was the driving motivation
behind Health is Global, not all interviewees agreed with
this rationale, arguing that it was a threat to health
equity and undermined development efforts. Using de-
velopment aid to further the UK’s security agenda is one
of the policies that Britain’s new Prime Minister, David
Cameron, appears to be supporting. In his first Lord
Mayor speech in November 2010, Prime Minister
Cameron, like Brown before him, focused on hard-headed
internationalism albeit with an even stronger ‘hard-headed’
intent.
‘Our foreign policy is one of hard-headed internation-
alism. More commercial in enabling Britain to earn its
way in the world, more strategic in its focus on meeting
the new and emerging threats to our national security….
Above all, our foreign policy is more hard-headed in this
respect. It will focus like a laser on defending and advan-
cing Britain’s national interest’ [65].
This statement reinforces the conclusion that it is the
primacy of self-interest that will drive foreign policy
under the Cameron government, potentially even more
so than it had under Brown. In October 2010, Cameron
unveiled the new UK security strategy allocating a larger
proportion of DFID’s budget to addressing issues of
conflict [66]. Strengthening governance and security in
fragile and conflict-affected countries, in particular
Afghanistan and Pakistan, is among DFID’s five priorities
[67]. Critics described this as ‘development as counter-
terrorism’, arguing that aid should be disbursed on a
needs basis and not ‘according to Whitehall’s security
agenda’ [68].
Investing in development based on self-interest also
appears to be part of the messaging in DFID’s 2011–
2015 business plan which refers to development as
‘tremendous value for money and good for oureconomy, our safety, our health and our future ’ [[67],
p.2]. In keeping with the government’s new structural re-
form agenda, the plan strongly focuses on demonstrating
value for money with an emphasis on results, transpar-
ency and accountability. While this approach to aid can
potentially allow a better assessment of aid effectiveness,
carried to an extreme it could end up favouring projects
with short-term deliverables at the expense of long-term
infrastructure, or on countries with a greater existing
capacity to show returns at the expense of more vulner-
able states [37]. Having said this, and while DFID’s busi-
ness plan contains certain ‘hard-headed’ elements, it also
includes those that reflect the UK’s commitment to
benefiting others by investing in aid. The plan reiter-
ates the UK’s commitment to spending 0.7% of gross
national income on aid by 2013, which OECD reports
the country is well on the way to achieving, [69] and
includes priorities such as leading international action to
improve the lives of girls and women, combating climate
change, responding to humanitarian disasters and im-
proving the global development system [67].
While self-interest manifested through the global
health security framing may attract the attention of for-
eign policymakers, such positioning is potentially fraught
with risk for global health and can lead to what Fidler’s
refers to as global health ‘regression.’ Health may have
risen as a foreign policy concern but in a way that tar-
nishes it’s normative underpinning or what made health
special in the first place leaving it at the margins of trad-
itional foreign policy and vulnerable to shifting foreign
policy attention. Adding to this risk is the lack of a clear
and universal definition of global health security. As
Aldis argues, policymakers in industrialized countries
emphasize protection of their populations against exter-
nal threats when talking about global health security,
while policymakers in developing countries and the UN
system understand the term in a broader public health
or human security context [70]. This definitional prob-
lem may help explain why the term is used somewhat
confusingly as a catch-all phrase in the Oslo Ministerial
Declaration. As a policy position developed by Ministers
from both developed and developing nations it raises the
question as to whether there was a common under-
standing of this concept as presented in the Declaration.
It is also difficult to assess the impact of such high
profile framing on other global health policy processes,
but as Kingdon’s model highlights, issue framing is an
important part of the policy process that can lead to a
significant bandwagon effect [21].
Policy process is global health diplomacy
As noted in the Introduction, GHD is generally consid-
ered to involve policy-shaping processes around health
challenges, or utilizing health concepts and issues to
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The examination of the Health is Global policy process
provides evidence to support this definition. It also leads
to a few specific conclusions about the nature of GHD
at the state level when actors aim to develop whole-of
-government strategies. As a starting point, the in-depth
analysis of the UK process allows a number of more
specific defining characteristics to be formulated:
 While non-state actors provide important inputs
into the process, the final negotiation of the content
of the strategy takes place among state actors, in
particular those representing health, foreign affairs
and development government departments which,
assuming that there is political will behind the
policy direction, are compelled to arrive at a strategy
within a given timeframe that is acceptable to all
relevant government actors. As the UK case
revealed and the Kingdon model helps to explain,
the process leading up to the state negotiation stage
can be lengthy, potentially lasting many years. It is
during this time that non-state actors can act in
policy communities as policy advocates softening up
and framing the policy space. Connections with
policymakers and other policy entrepreneurs provide
opportunities to influence policy direction further as
does the development of evidence to support
varying policy alternatives. Non-state actors can play
an important challenging function, particularly
during the strategy framing process, by drawing
attention to global health equity issues.
 State actors negotiate the finer details of the strategy
but as the UK case showed a process that aims to
include actors from the public, private and civil
sectors who will work with government to
eventually implement the strategy appears to be an
effective approach. The desired outcome helps to
determine what process to put in place. If the intent
is to develop a comprehensive global health strategy
that will require multi-sectoral actors to help
implement such actors should be involved as
partners in the process from the outset.
 Leadership in the policy process by an authoritative,
credible policy entrepreneur is a critical success
factor. Such leaders have specific attributes, the
most important of which is that they have
knowledge, experience and training in both health/
medicine and international relations enabling them
to understand, be credible and connect within both
contexts. Political leadership from the head of
government is also critical.
 The whole-of-government process is difficult,
complex, fraught with differing policy perspectives
and positions and time consuming. Skillfulnegotiation and consensus building is required to
arrive at an acceptable strategy for all involved as
are cross government processes and structures such
as interministerial working groups and committees.
The UK case showed that significant compromise
could be required to reach an agreement and ‘sign-
off ’ on a strategy. While the process is difficult,
interviewee comments indicated that it was
nonetheless an important way of building common
understanding across government and broke down
silos to working together. This was perceived to be a
positive consequence of the policy development
process.
Conclusions
This paper provides significant insight into why and how
health is integrated in foreign policy, which has helped
to better define and crystallize the global health diplo-
macy process at the state level. Many of the main con-
clusions are similar to the unreported findings from the
three background cases conducted as part of this study.
Self-interest is the dominant reason that the UK devel-
oped Health is Global, a rationale that could become
even stronger and deeper in a climate of economic con-
straint. This conclusion is consistent with the results of
the Norway and Swiss cases in which self-interest was
also the dominant rationale for investing in global
health, i.e. to protect national and international security
and their economic interests. In these cases, consistent
with that of the UK, investing in global health was also
seen as a way to enhance the state’s international reputa-
tion. In terms of self-interest, however, Brazil was an out-
lier. International solidarity and health as a human right
have been the driving forces behind its long-term invest-
ment in development cooperation to date. Investing in
health for normative reasons was also a prevalent though
weaker theme in the UK, Swiss and Norwegian cases.
In the UK case and the three background cases, the
role that policy entrepreneur leaders, particularly those
with expertise and experience in both health and inter-
national relations and other actors play in the process is
extremely important. The WHO is regarded as a highly
important and relevant institutional actor in global
health diplomacy but recently it has been argued that
organizational reforms are greatly needed if it is to con-
tinue to play this role effectively. This discussion also
highlighted particular characteristics of the global health
diplomacy process at the state level that may be helpful
for other states to consider when developing similar
whole-of-government global health strategy. Even if the
current context in such countries is not ideal for such a
strategy to take root because of the world’s current
economic situation, based on a more in-depth under-
standing of the process, it is important for policy
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their efforts to influence and lead policy change. The
softening up process can take many years but is an
important preparatory phase in creating readiness for
policy change when the ‘problem, policy and politics’
streams align and a policy window opens.
Endnotes
aInterventionism is defined as the use or threat of
force or coercion to alter a political or cultural situation
normally outside the intervener’s moral or political juris-
diction. It commonly deals with a government’s inter-
ventions in other governments’ affairs [71].
bBy “neo-liberal premise” this interviewee was refer-
ring to an investment in development to further state
economic interests in the context of globalization.
c The right to health (technically, the Right to the
Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental
Health) is the human rights statement most central to
GHD, and every country is now party to at least one
international instrument that includes health-related
rights [72]. Article 12 of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) provides
the most detail on this right [73]. General Comment 14
(GC 14), legally less binding than Article 12 itself, elabo-
rates a broader range of actions required for the progres-
sive realization of this right [74]. GC 14 further states that
‘collective rights are critical in the field of health’ [74].
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